Modelling distribution of aggregate expenditure on tourism

The aim of this article is to obtain a statistical distribution that describes the aggregate expenditure of tourists related to their length of stay at a given location. This distribution enables us to estimate two parameters simultaneously; one controls the length of stay and the other, the expense incurred. We propose two distribution models, for which closed-form expressions are obtained. Covariates are introduced in order to study the factors that affect the aggregate expenditure. The results obtained indicate that the models achieve a reasonably good fit, with and without covariates.     

省域尺度下不同时序景观指数集与粒度效应分析

[目的]景观格局变化是景观生态学中的热点问题。研究省域尺度下不同时序景观指数的粒度效应、选取计算景观指数所需的适宜粒度范围并筛选出代表性景观指数集对分析景观格局变化具有重要意义。[方法]以安徽省土地覆被为研究对象,以2000年、2005年、2010年的Landsat TM遥感影像为主要数据源,采用土地利用转移矩阵对安徽省土地覆被的转移数量与方向进行研究;通过设置不同的栅格大小研究景观指数的粒度效应并选取合适的粒度范围;基于相关性分析、因子分析与敏感性分析,筛选出代表性景观指数集。[结果](1) 2000—2010年安徽省的土地覆被始终以耕地为主,其次是林地与人工表面;人工表面的增加是建立在耕地面积减少基础之上的,在10年间共有超过3 200km2的耕地转化为人工表面;(2)景观指数存在粒度效应,粒度变化会对景观指数的计算结果产生影响;省域尺度下计算景观指数所需的合适粒度范围为100～125m;(3)研究安徽省景观格局变化的代表性景观指数有4个,分别为最大斑块指数、景观形状指数、平均斑块面积、香农多样性指数。[结论]计算安徽省景观指数的适宜粒度范围为100～125m,安徽省的代表性景观指数集为最大斑块指数、景观形状指数、平均斑块面积、香农多样性指数,为进一步研究景观格局变化及驱动机制提供了依据。     

New development: Fiscal reform in South Korea: looking back and moving forward

ABSTRACT

At first glance, it seems that South Korea’s three fiscal systems (mid-term expenditure framework, top-down budgeting, and performance management) function well. However, each fiscal system operates separately and they are inefficient because they follow past practices. This article explains what the problems are and how to overcome them.     

Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.     

政府间竞争影响城市土地市场化水平的双边效应研究：基于财政竞争和引资竞争的不同作用

研究目的:本文将政府间竞争划分为财政竞争和引资竞争,比较两者对城市土地市场化水平影响的大小,分析政府间竞争与城市土地市场化水平之间的关系。研究方法:基于2003—2016年全国284个地级市的面板数据,利用双边随机前沿模型测算财政竞争和引资竞争对城市土地市场化水平的影响。研究结果:财政竞争对城市土地市场化水平具有正向效应,提高了城市土地市场化水平1.61%;引资竞争对城市土地市场化水平具有负向效应,降低了城市土地市场化水平12.51%;政府间竞争总体上降低了城市土地市场化水平10.90%。时间趋势表明,政府间竞争对城市土地市场化水平的抑制作用呈现波动下降的状态。研究结论:政府间竞争降低了城市土地市场化水平。     

Determinants of the allocative,cost and scope efficiencies of Indian banks

ABSTRACT

This study aims to investigate the impact of competition on determinants of allocative, scope and cost efficiencies of Indian scheduled commercial banks (SCBs). Specifically, the study, analyzes the impact of the second round of licensing on the efficiency of Indian SCBs. This is the first paper to measure scope efficiency of Indian banks and analyze its determinants. A two-stage analysis is performed on a balanced panel dataset of Indian SCBs for the period 1999–2016. In the first stage, the allocative, cost and scope efficiencies for each bank are estimated following the data envelopment analysis approach. In the second stage, internal determinants of the stated efficiency measures are estimated following the system of the generalized method of moments approach. The findings suggest that competition has not resulted in enhancing the efficiency of Indian SCBs. Among factors that can influence efficiency, it is seen that size does matter. Larger banks can enhance the efficiency of SCBs. It is also seen that having more foreign banks improves the overall efficiency of SCBs. However, before embarking on further rounds of licensing, the study posits that market-driven correction to succeed, it is imperative to address sunspots in the form of investor or borrower repression.     

森林食品产业减贫的作用机理及效应分析

首先,介绍森林食品产业减贫的作用机理,主要包括解决资源落后与发展滞后的矛盾;促进贫困地区收入增长;注重多方交流互动。其次,将森林食品产业的减贫效应分为社会减贫效应、经济减贫效应、生态减贫效应这3个部分。最后,提出加强基础设施建设与品牌宣传;增加产业联动效应;持续带动地区增收等建议,以期为政府相关部门制定政策提供决策依据。     

Global energy forecasting competition 2017: Hierarchical probabilistic load forecasting

The Global Energy Forecasting Competition 2017 (GEFCom2017) attracted more than 300 students and professionals from over 30 countries for solving hierarchical probabilistic load forecasting problems. Of the series of global energy forecasting competitions that have been held, GEFCom2017 is the most challenging one to date: the first one to have a qualifying match, the first one to use hierarchical data with more than two levels, the first one to allow the usage of external data sources, the first one to ask for real-time ex-ante forecasts, and the longest one. This paper introduces the qualifying and final matches of GEFCom2017, summarizes the top-ranked methods, publishes the data used in the competition, and presents several reflections on the competition series and a vision for future energy forecasting competitions.     

农产品直播效果影响因素分析

随着互联网技术、网络技术等与农产品深度融合,新一轮农产品销售模式孕育兴起.农产品直播销售为各行业带来巨大的商机,农产品直播已经成了农民的"新农具",各大直播平台都开展了各种直播活动.在前人研究的基础上,结合直播实践,通过因子分析法分析农产品直播效果的影响因素,以期改善农产品直播效果,促进农产品销售.     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.